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Abstract 
It has been argued that in a free society, adults should be entitled to enter into private 
contracts without the interference of the state. However, under English law, husband and 
wife (or a couple in a same-sex marriage) are not free to enter into a legally binding contract 
in which they can set out their own terms when this right is afforded to other partnerships. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether such protection can or should be afforded 
to couples when entering into marriage. 
Divorce has financial consequences beyond those of the legal fees involved; the law holds 
that, despite the dissolution of the relationship, the parties retain obligations to support their 
former spouse. Such ‘needs’ are determined by the courts, with all property considered as 
appropriate for disposal.  
The increased number of remarriages and the increased age of first-time marriages have led 
to a growing desire for parties to protect the assets of each party as they enter into the state 
of matrimony. The right to autonomy in respect of their assets is therefore a point of 
contention.  
At a time when the legal system is trying to move to a more accessible, less court-driven 
system, to make divorce more accessible for individuals without the need for costly legal 
intervention, it has been suggested that a new approach is required to enable people to 
devise fair solutions for themselves. 
The Supreme Court judgment in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 supported the 
freedom of parties to determine their own division of assets, stating that nuptial agreements 
should be given ‘decisive weight’ unless the agreement itself is unfair – and it is the courts 
who determine what is considered ‘fair’. One could, therefore, suggest that the apparent 
power of parties to determine the division of assets is not as it seems, as the final decision 
remains with the courts if the agreement is challenged by either party. 
The government has recognised the need for clarity in this area of law, initially through the 
commissioning of Law Commission Report 208, Matrimonial Property Agreements. Shortly 
afterwards, this was extended to include the financial provision element of divorce, and 
Report 343, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements, was commissioned. Unusually, 
the government commissioned Report 343 before the research on Report 208 was 
complete, such was the importance placed upon this additional element. Their aim was to 
discern whether a simple statutory framework could be created to guide couples through the 
division of assets following the breakdown of their marriage. 
This paper discusses the impact of this judgment on the development of law in this area 
while critically analysing the future position following the recommendations of Law 
Commission Report 343, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements (2014). 
As an area of law of current interest both in legal practice and academia, this paper looks at 
the law in practice both before and after Radmacher v Granatino and Law Commission 
Report 343, and considers whether further reform is needed before the law is readily 
accessible to the ‘common man’. 
Keywords: Radmacher v Granatino; matrimonial property; marital agreements; nuptial 
agreements; marital contract; Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
 
Introduction  
 
Marital agreements, often referred to as prenuptial or postnuptial agreements, were once 
seen as something for the rich, only in the news for involving footballers, movie stars and 
musicians, and certainly not something the ordinary couple would consider when getting 
married. However, at a time when marriage is not necessarily the ‘forever’ state it once was, 
parties often remain cautious around their desire to protect what is theirs. Nuptial 
agreements, as reported in the press, often involve large sums of money or inherited wealth, 
but for many the desire is a simpler one – that of protecting what they bring to a relationship 
should their marriage later fail, such as when parties are embarking on a second marriage 
with assets they wish to protect for their children (the marital home, for example).  
 
It is important that the role the court plays in the division of assets is clear from the outset; 
everything is considered as ‘fair game’ by the courts. English law does not distinguish 
between marital and non-marital property (that is, assets not directly linked to the marriage). 
Consider the hypothetical situation of a couple, married with children from previous 
relationships, and one partner inherits part of a long-standing family business or a property 
on behalf of their children (on the basis that children under the age of 18 cannot own 
property). Is it fair that their share of the property should be divided with the new partner 
upon divorce, or should it be considered as non-marital property and thus not available when 
dividing the assets? It would appear unfair that someone unconnected with the initial 
business should benefit from this inheritance, but the law would allow for such a division, 
hence the desire of parties to protect such assets. As Fiona Kendall comments, ‘[m]arriage 
is the most important contract, for ourselves and for the wider world, that most of us will 
make, yet men and women sign up to it on an erotic high without mentioning the terms of the 
contract, still less examining them’.1 
 
The growing trend in divorce, the increased number of second (or subsequent) marriages 
and the increased age of first-time marriages has led to a growing need to protect the assets 
of each party as they enter into the state.2 It is this increase in agreements and the current 
uncertainty of their legal standing that continues to challenge the courts. This was 
recognised by the Law Commissionin 2011 with its consultation on Marital Property 
Agreements,3 later extended in 2012 with the supplementary consultation on Matrimonial 
Property, Needs and Agreements.4  
 
This paper considers the role of nuptial agreements in English and Welsh law in light of the 
precedent-setting case of Radmacher v Granatino,5 along with the recommendations set out 
by the 2014 Law Commission Report 343, Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements.6  
 
The law before Radmacher v Granatino 
 
In order to consider the impact of the Supreme Court judgment in Radmacher, we must first 
understand the position of the law under which this case was heard, in terms of both the 
statutory guidance and those cases that show how that guidance has been interpreted in 
action.  
 
Prenuptial agreements are considered to be binding legal contracts across the world; 
however, this is not the case in English law.7 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 delegates 
the power for determining ancillary relief to the courts, and while these powers are 
considerable – including ordering the adjustment of ownership of spousal property, ordering 
the transfer of pensions, and granting financial orders – the only guidance provided to the 
courts to assist them is the list of factors set out in Section 25 of the Act.8  
 
The judiciary cannot create new law to ‘fill a gap’, nor can they ignore a statute, but they can 
interpret the law as written to ensure the fairest outcome. It is this limitation that has 
previously guided the courts’ policy not to consider prenuptial agreements as binding, as to 
do so would oust the jurisdiction of the court, something that only parliament can do through 
legislation. It is this interpretation that guides future implementation through the doctrine of 
precedent, and a number of ‘key’ cases have set precedent for how the courts have 
historically implemented this legislation. ‘It used to be contrary to public policy for a married 
couple … to make an agreement that provided for the contingency that they might 
separate.’9 Marriage is an agreement to be together, and an agreement making provision for 
separation conflicts with this.10 
 
The legislation relating to financial/ancillary relief orders has therefore developed with the 
sociological needs of the nation. The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 11gave 
the courts the power to adjust property ownership and to make orders that financial provision 
be arranged for the weaker spouse. This was reconsidered in the 1980s and a change of 
emphasis recommended, as established in the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 
198412. Unfortunately, the guidance seemed contradictory, advocating both independence 
and the need to ensure that adequate financial provision is made for the spouse and 
children.13 This led to inconsistent approaches and a lack of certainty as to how the courts 
should rule. The Law Commission likened the lack of clarity to ‘a bus driver … given a large 
number of instructions about how to drive the bus, … authority to … [turn] left or right … the 
occasional advice or correction offered by three senior drivers’, but, of key importance, he is 
not told the destination, simply that it must be a reasonable one.14 
 
As has been mentioned, legislation does not distinguish between matrimonial and non-
matrimonial assets, simply listing ‘the income, earning capacity, property and other financial 
resources which each of the parties has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future’.15 This 
distinction is drawn by the common law in its search for fairness, but all of the couple’s 
assets will be considered in the event of a divorce. Some countries do not recognise non-
matrimonial property at all, though they offer the facility to allow couples to separate their 
property before marriage.16 The purpose of this review is not an attempt to unravel the 
complex nature of how the courts have considered this previously, but to note that in respect 
of prenuptial agreements, it may be desirable and possible to try to protect certain assets. 
For example, in the case of Hyman [1929],17 though not a prenuptial agreement, the courts 
held that parties could not, by agreement, prevent the courts from exercising their jurisdiction 
in financial matters. However, in Edgar [1980],18 an agreement was upheld as it did not oust 
the courts’ powers. More recently, in N v N [1999],19 Judge Wall commented that although 
prenuptial agreements were unenforceable, that did not mean they would not be upheld 
where justice required; this was later followed in M v M (Prenuptial Agreement) [2002], when 
Judge Connell stated ‘I do bear the agreement in mind as one of the more relevant 
circumstances of this case, but the court’s over-riding duty remains … to arrive at a solution 
that is fair in all the circumstances’.20 
 
Though the judgment in Radmacher provides a shift in the way the courts consider 
prenuptial agreements, before that case came several examples of changes in the way 
‘financial needs’ were considered; both elements are part of the Law Commission’s report, 
so are important to understand. 
 
In White [2000],21 the courts set out the sharing principle: once both parties’ financial needs 
are met, the starting point for the division of any surplus should be equal, and then weighted 
towards either party according to the circumstances in that particular case. In this case the 
court did consider non-matrimonial property when adjusting the weighting of the award, 
although it was at their discretion to do so.22 Such a ruling could increase the number of 
parties interested in a prenuptial agreement, not to avoid all financial responsibilities, as the 
courts have shown they will not allow for this, but to potentially try to ring-fence and protect 
certain assets, specifically as regards non-marital property. 
 
Another ruling of interest is the 2006 appeals of Miller; McFarlane,23 which were heard 
together and are thus reported together. Giving judgment, Lord Nicholls made clear that the 
focus was fairness, firstly considering financial needs, then any compensation due, then 
sharing, postulating that marriage is a partnership with the yardstick of equality to be applied, 
unless there is good reason to the contrary. 
 
Charman24 followed a year later, still trying to answer the question of which property the 
sharing principle applies to. As with Dart and McFarlane, the marriage had been of 
significant duration (30 years); the couple had children, though because of their age they 
would not be considered as children.25 The wife gave up work to raise the family and the 
husband was the breadwinner, and based upon this, the award of the court was a 63.5/36.5 
split. When rejecting the appeal, the court stated: ‘such a contribution should normally at 
least entitle the person who had made it to 55 per cent of the assets. However, it would be 
unlikely to entitle that party, after a very long marriage, to receive more than twice as much 
as the other party’, going on to suggest a limit of 66.6%.26 This followed the ruling in GW v 
RW that a partner who remains at home to look after the children retains a right to a share of 
the ‘pool of assets that is the fruit of the marital partnership’.27 
 
Newbury, writing in 2005, suggested that case law continued to re-emphasise the breadth of 
discretion that the courts have in applying the Section 25 factors, highlighting that as 
circumstances varied so significantly between cases, it was difficult to ascertain clear and 
consistent principles. What he felt was clear was that the relevance of each of the Section 
25(2) factors varied from case to case, depending upon individual circumstances.28 This 
could be seen to highlight the need for marital agreements to be given greater weight by the 
courts in allowing couples to retain some control over the assets of the relationship. 
 
Radmacher v Granatino – The judgment and implications 
 
As has been shown, before Radmacher, if a spouse sought to rely on a prenuptial 
agreement, the weight attributed to this was at the discretion of the court. Going forward, it 
has been stated that the courts will attribute decisive weight to the agreement ‘unless in the 
circumstances … it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement’.29 The court 
declined to be too prescriptive of the circumstances in which they would not hold a party to 
their agreement, instead reserving their discretion to assess each case on its merits.30 
Perhaps most importantly, the courts did not say that such agreements are binding, as to do 
so would oust the jurisdiction of the court.31 
 
During his introduction, Lord Phillips references both the Six Safeguards proposed by the 
Home Office in 199832 and the 2009 Family Agreements paper.33 It is interesting to note that 
the Radmacher agreement actually fell foul of the Six Safeguards insofar as there were 
children, and both parties did not obtain independent legal advice. On first hearing the case, 
Judge Baron referred to this failure and thus reduced the weight applied, but did not 
disregard it in full. This was overturned by the Appeal Court finding that the circumstances of 
the agreement should not have reduced the weight and that decisive weight should be 
applied. They ruled that the award should make provision for the husband’s role as a father, 
but no further.34 
 
The judgment in Radmacher considered the distinction between prenuptial and postnuptial 
agreements35 with consideration of the MacLeod case, in which a prenuptial agreement was 
signed but later varied, by consent, twice during the duration of the marriage. In MacLeod, it 
was held that the most recent variation of the agreement was enforceable, though it still 
reserved the court’s rights to vary the terms.36 The application of the three-stranded 
approach to fairness, as set out in Miller; McFarlane, was considered and held that it would 
be the first two, needs and compensation, which would render it unfair to hold a party to an 
agreement, but that should resources suffice, the division of the surplus could be done in 
accordance with the signed agreements.37 
 
The implications of this decision are, in many ways, yet to be truly tested, as it is only over 
time and through testing that a true precedent is established. Since the Radmacher 
judgment, the courts have been faced with few cases in which the principles established 
have been challenged. In GS v L, the court felt that as neither party had full appreciation of 
the implications of the agreement, little weight should be granted to the existence of the 
agreement, the grounds for this this being Lady Hale’s (dissenting) question: ‘Did each party 
freely enter into an agreement, intending it to have legal effect … with a full appreciation of 
its implications?’38 In effect, both parties must enter into the agreement willingly (without any 
pressure to sign), understanding the terms of the agreement (ideally having received 
independent legal advice prior to signature) and in the understanding that it is intended to be 
legally binding. These are not, however, considered as prerequisites for the agreement to be 
considered binding, as in V v V the courts recognised the right of the individuals to determine 
how their assets should be distributed, despite the fact that the wife had not had legal 
advice, nor had full disclosure as to the value of property been made.39 The courts found that 
as there had been no interest in the precise value being considered, it did not amount to 
material non-disclosure, and that although no independent legal advice had been sought, 
both parties were intelligent and had intended for the agreement to be effective; thus, it 
would not be unfair to hold the parties to their agreement. This can be distinguished from 
Kremen v Agrest, where the agreement was not upheld - the reasons given for this being 
lack of disclosure, lack of legal advice and pressure to sign with comment also made that 
that the party under pressure also had no understanding of the rights they were foregoing.40  
 
If we consider the suggestion that the courts should consider such agreements binding 
unless it is manifestly unfair to do so, then the court’s decision in Z v Z to uphold an 
agreement, insofar as it excluded the equal sharing principle but did not uphold the exclusion 
of maintenance claims, suggests that the courts are willing to be selective when considering 
the clauses contained in such agreements to ensure that the outcome is ‘fair’.41 
 
One of the challenges for marital agreements is this fairness obstacle. In her recent book, 
Sharon Thompson considers the unforeseeable ways in which financial positions may 
change over time, such as if one partner becomes very wealthy pursuing (and achieving) 
their goal while the other works to support the other, highlighting that fact that ‘marriage and 
family life … create dependence in a way that may not be anticipated by the terms of a 
prenup’.42 Her solution to this is to incorporate a need for regular review of the agreement at 
certain intervals – Kendall suggests certain anniversary dates or the birth of children.43 This 
suggestion of best practice would concur with the factors considered by the court when 
determining any settlement. Thompson then goes on to say that while matters do sometimes 
work out as anticipated and planned for, this should not detract from the reality that in many 
cases, particularly where the marriage is of a longer duration, the situations of the parties do 
change.  
 
The objectives of Report 343 
 
The current statutory framework for financial orders requires that judgment be considered 
and delivered by the courts, thus allowing the courts to tailor their ruling to ensure ‘fair’ 
distribution of assets, but requiring considerable involvement when the legal system is trying 
to be more accessible for individuals without the need for costly legal intervention.44 As 
Cooke comments, ‘however splendid this is for individually-tailored justice, it does not make 
for predictability and can only proliferate argument, risk, stress and costs’.45 A new approach 
is required to enable people to devise fair solutions for themselves, or to use other methods 
of dispute resolution.  
 
The original consultation46 focused on Matrimonial Agreements and their enforcement, 
which, in turn, raised broader issues about financial provision orders. To combat this, and 
before any report on its findings could be determined, a supplementary consultation was 
opened on Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements.47 The focus of this extension was 
financial provision on divorce. To what extent should one spouse be required to meet the 
other’s financial needs? What exactly is meant by needs? And what happens to property that 
is owned by one party before the marriage or acquired during the course of it? It is the 
outcome of this later combined report that we will consider here. 
 
The report was commissioned to review the current situation in order to establish whether a 
simple, statutory framework could be created to help guide couples through this period, the 
intention being to render the law more certain and predictable ‘without jeopardising the 
protection that the law offers to those who are made vulnerable by family breakdown’.48 
 
The Law Commission drew no distinction between marriage and civil partnership in any 
matters covered in the report, nor did it anticipate that the introduction of same-sex marriage 
would make any difference to its recommendations.49 
 
Conclusions and recommendations of Report 343 
 
The Law Commission is clear from the start that its recommendations are not intended to be 
a final solution, but ‘staging posts in an ongoing journey’, highlighting that this is an area of 
law ‘constantly under pressure from social change, public opinion, economic pressures and 
legal influence from abroad’.50  
 
The Law Commission found that the courts had gone as far as they could in ‘endorsing the 
validity of marital property agreements without amendment of the statutory framework’, 
highlighting that only the enforcement of new legislation could enable parties to enforce 
agreements without involving the courts.51 In answer to this obstacle, the report included a 
draft bill suggesting that couples be allowed to create a Qualifying Nuptial Agreement (QNA) 
to define the allocation of assets in the event of divorce or dissolution of the marriage, setting 
out clear criteria to be met before it could be considered as binding.52 It did not remove the 
discretionary powers of the court already granted under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 
retaining the right to make alterations to the agreement, thus allowing couples to legitimately 
challenge the matter.53 
 
QNAs would not overrule or limit the courts’ power in determining financial provision when 
the needs of the children are to be considered. Nor will they be binding if the terms are not 
considered to meet the financial needs of both parties.54 The report does not provide a 
definition of financial means, deferring to future guidance to be published by the Family 
Justice Council.55  
 
Owing to the date of publication, there was insufficient time for parliament to fully consider 
the proposed bill before it was dissolved and, as a result, it was held over until parliament 
was reconvened.56 This remains a draft bill and has not yet been fully considered by 
parliament.  
 
Family Justice Council report on financial needs in divorce 
 
The request by the Law Commission for clarification on the meaning of ‘financial needs’ was 
intended to ensure that the term is applied consistently by the courts.57 The creation of a 
‘formula’ to aid calculation was discussed, but caution was advised, suggesting that any 
developed would take the form of non-statutory guidance.58 The Commission hoped that the 
guidance would provide ‘words, not figures’ to assist those without legal representation, or 
non-legally qualified mediators, to make practical arrangements, along with consistency from 
the courts.59 
 
The Commission was of the opinion that clear guidance on financial needs would be 
invaluable. They recognised that most couples going through a divorce do not have their 
financial arrangements determined by a judge, but instead, make use of mediation, 
arbitration or assistance from lawyers.60 It is therefore not appropriate for the law to say ‘it is 
up to the judge’ when, for many, they will not have their case considered and determined by 
the courts. 
 
Initially expected to be published by the end of 2014,61 the requested report was published in 
April 2016.62 Owing to the time that has elapsed since publication, it is not yet possible to 
assess the value of this in practice. This new report, though providing the desired 
clarification in identifying a ‘need’, is unlikely to open the door for more couples to meet the 
prerequisites needed to form a binding QNA as it focuses on the most frequent situations – 
those where the assets do not meet or exceed the ‘needs’ of both parties.63 As was 
highlighted in the report, a prenuptial agreement will only be upheld when it is fair to do so, 
thus taking the circumstances that exist at the point of divorce into consideration, which is 
contingent upon both partners’ needs being met.64 
 
Reflections on the consultation and report 
 
This is not the first consultation by HM Government in which the status of nuptial 
agreements has been considered. In the 1998 Home Office Supporting Families 
consultation, the ‘Six Safeguards’ were set out as a safety net so that if one or more applied, 
the agreement would not be held to be legally binding.65 The criteria set out at that time were 
not dissimilar to those now suggested, and the government of the time decided not to move 
forward with any statutory amendments.  
 
It has been suggested that the prerequisites to succeed as a QNA are such that they will be 
unobtainable to all but the most wealthy couples, purely on the basis that the majority will 
have insufficient capital or assets within the matrimonial pot to meet the needs of both 
parties and of any children of the union.66 The Commission itself highlighted QNAs as being 
of particular use to high-net-worth couples to protect business interests or inheritance. It also 
identified a second group of beneficiaries, namely those who have been in a relationship 
previously and wish to safeguard property or assets for their children from that earlier 
union.67 
 
Although the report provides some clarification as to how the law should be applied to 
financial provision in divorce, it could have gone further and provided a more definitive 
definition of financial needs in the post-divorce context, specifically as it relates to the 
distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property, with one writer describing the 
lack of guidance as ‘disappointing’.68 Indeed, one of the questions raised by the Commission 
in the final report was which rules should apply when the profits from the sale of an inherited 
property are used to fund the marital home?69 No guidelines for this were provided within the 
2014 report, nor within the draft bill, with the lack of clarification justified on the grounds that 
there was no consensus of opinion among the consultees, that the question of non-
matrimonial property only arises in a minority of cases, and that in such cases it is preferable 
to allow couples to make their own arrangement by way of a QNA.70 The Commission did 
allow that statutory provision may be necessary in the future once more cases have been 
heard and the implication of non-matrimonial property has been further explored.71 
 
The argument for further reform 
 
It has been said that it is only by the interference of the state that the binding nature of 
prenuptial agreements are not upheld.72 Similarly, Cretney comments on the irrationality of 
the law, questioning why English law does not ‘allow husband and wife by contract … to 
make their own agreement as to the terms … when this right is accorded to other 
partnerships’.73 
 
Todd suggests that in a free society, adults should be entitled to enter into private contracts 
without the interference of the state and that only in cases of presumed undue influence 
should they step in; this does allow for the state to retain a supervisory role, albeit a very 
limited one. This libertarian position is that, absent of undue influence of state, the parties 
should be held to their bargains.74 
 
The family law organisation Resolution has, for some time, pressed for the law to be made 
clearer. The intention is that couples should have a clearer understanding of the status of 
nuptial agreements, that such agreements will, subject to all the usual requirements of a 
contract, be held to be binding, and that only in the very rarest case would they be held to be 
otherwise.75,76 Jo Edwards, speaking on behalf of Resolution, welcomed the report, 
highlighting that although since Radmacher prenuptial agreements have, in effect, been 
made legally binding, it is only when tested by the courts that this can be certain. She 
commented that, where an agreement is put in place, the proposals ‘make their legal 
situation much clearer and reduce uncertainty upon separation’.77 She did go on to comment 
that Resolution would prefer to see change that would allow wider access to prenuptial 
agreements. Such clarification and altered expectation could reduce the cost of divorce, as 
assets and income would remain within the marital pot for division rather than being used on 
costly litigation. If we hold that the Commission report did not go far enough, and that the 
proposals will not benefit a wide enough group, it would support the need for further reform. 
 
The argument to maintain the status quo 
 
In Miller; McFarlane, Baroness Hale comments ‘[t]he nature and the source of the property 
and the way the couple have run their lives may be taken into account in deciding how it 
should be shared’, but goes on to caution that this approach might not be fair. ‘What seems 
fair and sensible at the outset of a relationship may seem much less fair and sensible when 
it ends.’78 Though this judgment predates both the Radmacher case and the Law 
Commission report, the sentiment is true to the intent of the statute in trying to ensure the 
fairest possible outcome. This would support the idea that any QNA would not be considered 
100% binding and would remain subject to the jurisdiction of the court. 
 
The Law Commission originally started work on this project in 2009, the enquiry being 
confined to the legal effects of nuptial agreements. The project itself was extended to take 
account of the Radmacher case and the publication in 2011 of the Family Justice Review 
report in which recommendation was made that a full review of the financial consequences 
of divorce was needed. The Commission has made its recommendations and has accepted 
that it did not feel it appropriate to legislate on all areas under consideration, but did allow 
that this may change in the future.79 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is accepted that the cases discussed throughout this article involve high-value capital and 
assets; indeed, the courts themselves have recognised this discrepancy with the comment ‘it 
seems …unfortunate that our law … should be largely dictated by cases which bear no 
resemblance to the ordinary lives of most divorcing couples and to the average case’.80 The 
judgment then goes onto reflect that the sums involved are so far beyond the experience or 
contemplation of most, that whether the award is £5 million or £8 million, the recipient is still 
very rich, and that the application of the ‘sharing’ and ‘needs’ principles look very different in 
cases where the latter predominates and the parties’ assets are a tiny percentage of those 
encountered in these high-profile cases. In the considered cases it is often possible to 
separate marital and non-marital property; this is not the case for most divorcing couples 
when the pool of assets is insufficient to sustain two households.  
 
Society itself is changing, and as it does so the requirements of the law alter accordingly. At 
the 2015 Family Law Association AGM in St Andrews, the point was raised that in the USA, 
the ownership and use of computer content, digital images and social media accounts have 
begun to be considered within prenuptial agreements, with ‘social media executors’ starting 
to be appointed and even explicitly legislated for in some jurisdictions.81 With more families 
making use of shared online accounts (iTunes, for example), there is potential for conflict as 
to who should retain the right to this asset. Twenty years ago this would not have been a 
consideration, but in the current age of technology, individuals could have accounts worth 
thousands of pounds once films, apps, books, etc. are all considered.  
 
The Commission’s final report does not provide answers to all the questions it set out to 
consider, and the Commission itself accepts this point as regards ‘non-matrimonial 
property’.82 We can hope that future cases to be determined by the courts will provide further 
guidance and clarity, but the Commission does make reference to the right of autonomy and 
the right to decide in respect of such assets.83 A draft bill has been composed, but not yet 
accepted into law. It is an ongoing situation and one that will continue to develop, and the 
Commission recognises this and highlights that further intervention may be required in the 
future.84 Indeed, as was noted in Miller; McFarlane, ‘[f]airness is an elusive concept. It is an 
instinctive response to a given set of facts … grounded in social and moral values … they 
change from one generation to the next’.85 With the delay in publication of the Family Justice 
Council report on financial needs, this, too, has yet to be truly tested by the courts. 
 
In Miller; McFarlane, it was commented that ‘there remains a widespread feeling in this 
country that … a judge should know who was to blame for the breakdown of the marriage’.86 
Although this case predates both Radmacher and the Law Commission report, I suspect it is 
still a belief held by many – that the innocent party should not suffer ‘unfairly’. 
 
The purpose of this paper was to assess any underlying shift in the approach of the courts 
following both the Radmacher case and the Law Commission report. However, it suggests 
that for the majority of couples looking to divorce, the report will have little impact. This 
research has also highlighted that, despite the recommendations of the Law Commission 
report, legislation continues to provide no clear guidance on the financial responsibilities of 
each party to their former spouse. Thus, it could be rationally surmised that the legal system 
will continue to evolve as cases come before it. 
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